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CASENOTE

TORTS:

THE ABOLISHMENT OF THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY DocTRINE-CHILDREN MAY RECOVER DAMAGES FROM PARENTS IN
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONs-Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d

326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d
94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ohio Supreme Court has unleashed an assault on tort immunity doctrines in an attempt to provide a recourse for injured tort victims. This assault began in 1983 when the court abolished the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.' One year later, the Ohio Supreme Court proceeded to strike down the doctrine of charitable immunity.2 These two
cases exemplified a change in the supreme court's policy toward antiquated doctrines.
This change in policy regarding immunities was further established in the 1984 case of Kirchner v. Crystal,3 wherein the Ohio Supreme Court held that the doctrine of parental immunity was "abolished without reservation." 4 With this abolition, the court finally
eliminated a doctrine that had stood for thirty-three years "as an impervious obstacle for almost all children who have attempted to insti1. Enghauser Mfg. Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983).
The plaintiff in Enghauser brought an action against the city of Lebanon, Ohio, alleging that the
city's negligent construction of a new bridge and roadway resulted in the flooding of the plaintiff's
neighboring industrial property. The city raised the defense of governmental (sovereign) immunity
from tort liability. The court rejected the defense, holding that "so far as municipal governmental
responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity." Id. at 33,
451 N.E.2d at 230. The Ohio legislature has since brought back governmental immunity, albeit in
a limited form. See Act of Nov. 20, 1985, 1985 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-670 (Baldwin) (to be codified
in scattered sections of tits. I, 3, 5, 7, 33, 44, and 47 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1985)).
2. Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Ass'n for Child Dev., 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d
867 (1984). In Albritton, the mother of a minor child brought suit for the injuries her child
received while at a Head-Start day care program operated by two nonprofit organizations. The
court rejected the defendants' argument that the action was barred by the doctrine of charitable
immunity, holding that "a charitable organization is subject to liability in tort to the same extent
as individuals and corporations." Id. at 214, 466 N.E.2d at 871. See Note, Torts: Another Citadel
Crumbles-Ohio Abolishes the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity-Albritton v. Neighborhood
Centers Association for Child Development, 12 Ohio St. 3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 (1984), II U.
DAYTON L. REV. 103 (1985).
3. 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
4. Id. at 327, 474 N.E.2d at 276.
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tute legal proceedings against their parents, in order to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the parent's tortious actions.",
The Kirchner decision was the first of two cases that eliminated intra6
familial immunities. In Shearer v. Shearer, a 1985 Ohio Supreme
Court decision, the court reaffirmed the Kirchner decisionJ while also
abolishing the doctrine of interspousal immunity.' In reaffirming Kirchner, the Shearer court stated: "The Kirchner case used an historical
analysis, i.e., a consideration of the history of the doctrine and the
traditional arguments offered to support it. Our analysis will be more
empirical than historical . . ... 9 Thus, the Shearer decision strengthened the Kirchner decision by taking a different approach, yet it
reached the same result. As a result of these decisions, injured children
have a higher probability of obtaining a recovery for their injuries.
This casenote will review the developments that led to the establishment and ultimate destruction of the doctrine of parental immunity.
It will then combine the reasoning of the Kirchner and Shearer decisions and it will focus on the effects these decisions are likely to have in
Ohio.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Kirchner v. Crystal'0 was a personal injury action brought by
three children and their mother against their father-/husband. The defendant-father, Larry Crystal, was the operator of a motor vehicle that
was involved in an accident." The plaintiffs were the injured passengers of the Crystal automobile. 2 They alleged that their injuries were
3
the result of the defendant's negligent driving.'
The case was tried in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas for
Cuyahoga County.' That court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on his defense that the doctrines of parental
15
immunity and interspousal immunity barred the plaintiffs' action.

5. Id.
6. 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
7. Id. at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 392.
8. Id. at 99, 480 N.E.2d at 394 (1985). Using an empiricist approach, based on evidence
that no state that had abolished the doctrines was suffering any ill-effects, the court held that the
doctrines of parental and interspousal immunity were anachronistic and invalid. Id. at 95-96, 480
N.E.2d at 391.
9. Id. at 95, 480 N.E.2d at 391.
10. 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
II. Id. at 326, 474 N.E.2d at 275.
12. Id., 474 N.E.2d at 276.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/9
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The court's decision was appealed by one of the injured children. 6 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and the case went
to the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to an allowance of a motion to
certify the record. 17 Because the mother/wife chose not to appeal the
trial court's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the sole
issue of whether to uphold the doctrine of parental immunity. The
court reversed both the court of appeals and the trial court, holding
that the doctrine of parental immunity and its corollary, the child immunity doctrine, were abolished.' 8
The Kirchner decision was quickly and resoundingly reaffirmed by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Shearer v. Shearer. 9 In Shearer, both the
spouse and the child of the defendant initiated tort actions, seeking
damages for the injuries they received as a result of an automobile accident." The plaintiffs contended that the defendant's negligent driving
caused the accident.2 ' The defendant raised the doctrines of parental
immunity and interspousal immunity as defenses.12 Both causes of action were summarily dismissed by the trial court;23 the appellate court
affirmed.2 4 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
the trial court, holding that both the doctrines of parental immunity
5
and interspousal immunity were abolished.

III.

BACKGROUND

The parental immunity doctrine was judicially created in the 1891
case of Hewellette v. George.26 The doctrine, however, is generally rec-

16. Id. It can be inferred from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion that the appellant appealed alone because he believed that, as a stepson, he could create an exception to the parental
immunity doctrine; that is, the traditional need to preserve family harmony and parental control
are not present in a suit between a stepparent and a stepchild. The supreme court, however, stated
that "creating such an exception [to the parental immunity doctrine] would inevitably produce
another meaningless distinction without any real differences." Id. at 327, 474 N.E.2d at 276.
Instead, the court chose to abolish the doctrine completely, "without reservation." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 330, 474 N.E.2d at 278-79.
19. 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
20. Id. at 94, 480 N.E.2d at 390.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 95-96, 98-99, 480 N.E.2d at 390-94.
26. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The plaintiff-daughter in Hewellette sued her mother
for wrongful confinement in an insane asylum. The Mississippi Supreme Court held:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the
minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at
-, 9 So. at 887.
Published
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ognized as having its origin in what is commonly referred to as the
"great trilogy" of cases:2 7 Hewellette, McKelvey v. McKelvey," and
Roller v. Roller." These cases are credited with establishing the major
rationales which most courts rely on to support their application of the
parental immunity doctrine. 30 The rationales are: (1) maintenance of
family harmony,3 1 (2) protection of parental authority and control,3 2
(3) protection of the "family exchequer," 3 (4) analogy of interspousal
immunity doctrine to parental immunity doctrine," and (5) prevention
of the parent held liable from receiving, through inheritance, any of the
funds he or she paid to the child." Another rationale advanced by several courts in supporting the parental immunity doctrine was the fear
36
of fraudulent or collusive claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court did not rule on the validity of the parental immunity doctrine until it decided the 1952 case of Signs v. Signs. 7
The Signs decision created an exception to the doctrine of parental immunity, starting the doctrine on a roller coaster ride that ended with its
destruction in Kirchner v. Crystal.3 8 In Signs, the seven-year-old son of
the defendant was burned when a gasoline pump, owned by a partnership in which the defendant was a partner, caught fire.3 9 The plaintiffson brought a tort action against his father. On a motion to certify the
record, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "an unemancipated child
should have . . . a right to maintain an action in tort against his parent
in the latter's business or vocational capacity."' 0 The court's rationale
was that the justifications for the doctrine of parental immunity disappear when the negligent parent is acting in a business capacity. 1 Al-

27. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 489, 495 (1982).
28. 11I Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (child prohibited from suing her father or stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment inflicted upon her by the stepmother).
29. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (child who was raped by her father could not sue him
for the pain and suffering she endured).
30. Hollister, supra note 27, at 495.
31. Hewellette, 68 Miss. at __, 9 So. at 887.
32. McKelvey, I II Tenn. at 389, 77 S.W. at 664.
33. Roller, 37 Wash. at 244, 79 P. at 789 ("family exchequer" is synonymous with "family
finances").
34. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g.. Denis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C. 1968); Coleman v. Coleman,
157 Ga. App. 533, 278 S.E.2d 114 (1981).
37. 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
38. 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
39. Signs, 156 Ohio St. at 566, 103 N.E.2d at 744.
40. Id. at 577, 103 N.E.2d at 748-49. At trial, the common pleas court ruled for the defendant following a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 567, 103 N.E.2d at 744. This
decision was reversed by the appellate court. Id.
41. Id. at 577, 103 N.E.2d at 748-49. The court rejected all of the traditional rationales
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/9
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though the court never expressly stated that the parental immunity
doctrine had been adopted in Ohio, its creation of an exception to the
doctrine implied that the doctrine was valid.
Fourteen years after Signs, in Teramano v. Teramano, 2 the Ohio
Supreme Court removed any doubt concerning its position on the parental immunity doctrine by upholding its validity. Teramano involved
an automobile accident in which the defendant-father, while under the
influence of intoxicants, allegedly drove into his own driveway at a high
rate of speed, striking his son. 3 The son was severely injured and
brought an action against his father alleging negligence and willful
misconduct." The Ohio Supreme Court held that absent malicious intent, the doctrine of parental immunity barred the plaintiff's action.' 5
The court stated that Signs merely created one exception to the parental immunity doctrine-any time the "parental relationship is abandoned," the immunity will not apply."' The court noted that the relationship was abandoned under circumstances like Signs when the tort
occured while the parent was engaged in his or her occupation."7 If
there was no abandonment, as in the Teramano case, the parental im8
munity defense would be recognized.4
In Karam v. Allstate Insurance Co.,49 the Ohio Supreme Court
formulated a very narrow definition of the "abandonment of the parental relationship" test that had been established in Teramano.5 n The
Teramano court stated that the parental immunity doctrine would not
apply when the parental relationship was abandoned. 51 In Karam, however, the court held that the parental immunity doctrine applied when
the alleged negligent parent was deceased. 52 If the death of the parent
did not result in the "abandonment of the parental relationship," it is
difficult to perceive when the court would consider the parental relationship to be abandoned.

supporting the doctrine of parental immunity. See id. at 573-77, 103 N.E.2d at 747-49. For a
listing of the rationales supporting the parental immunity doctrine, see supra text accompanying
notes 31-36.
42. 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966), overruled, Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.
3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1985).
43. See id. at 117, 216 N.E.2d at 376.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 119, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 70 Ohio St. 2d 227, 436 N.E.2d 1014 (1982), overruled, Dorsey v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (1984).
50. See Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d at 119, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
51. Id.
52. Karam, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 234, 436 N.E.2d at 1019.
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The Karam case involved an automobile accident in which a
mother was killed and her child was injured.5 3 The child sued the
mother's estate, alleging that the mother's negligent driving caused the
accident and the resulting injury.54 The court relied on two rationales
in reaching its decision that the parental immunity doctrine barred the
child's cause of action. First, the court applied the "abandonment of
the parental relationship" test, but found there was "no abandonment
in the sense of volitional action by [the deceased parent] in the termination of her relationship with the [child] . . . . 55 Second, the court
56
held there was a need to. prevent fraudulent and collusive claims.
The Karam court reasoned that these two considerations justified
its reaffirmation of Teramano.57 The effect of this decision was to restrict application of the Teramano decision by limiting the "abandonment of parental relationship" test to circumstances where the parent
58
acted willfully or while in the scope of his or her occupation. This
resulted in a broader use of the parental immunity doctrine, and
seemed to assure the continued adherence of the court to this doctrine.
Two years later, however, the Ohio Supreme Court retreated from this
liberal stance.
59
In Dorsey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Ohio Supreme Court overruled Karam and held that the doctrine of
parental immunity did not apply when the negligent parent was deceased.6 0 As in Karam, the cause of action in Dorsey arose from the
6
alleged negligent driving of the plaintiffs' mother. " The accident resulted in Mrs. Dorsey's death and injuries to her four children, the
plaintiffs in the case. The court reasoned that "[w]hen the parenttortfeasor dies, the parent-child relationship terminates insofar as parental immunity is concerned." 62 The court, therefore, returned to the
position it adopted in Signs-the parental immunity doctrine would not
apply when the parent-child relationship was abandoned. Thus, after
Dorsey, the pendulum had apparently swung back toward a narrow ap-

53. Id. at 227, 436 N.E.2d at 1015.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 232, 436 N.E.2d at 1018.
56. Id. at 233-34, 436 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
57. Id. at 234, 436 N.E.2d at 1019.
58. Id. at 232, 436 N.E.2d at 1018.
59. 9 Ohio St. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (1984).
60. Id. at 29-30, 457 N.E.2d at 1171. The court relied on a previous decision which had
held that the doctrine of interspousal immunity did not bar a spouse's wrongful death action. Id.
at 29, 457 N.E.2d at 1170-71 (citing Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983)).
The Dorsey court stated that the rationales used in justifying the Prem decision were also applicable to the parent-child situation. Id., 457 N.E.2d at 1171.
61. Id. at 28, 457 N.E.2d at 1169-70.
62. Id. at 29, 457 N.E.2d at 1171.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/9
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plication of the doctrine of parental immunity, and a broader interpretation of the "abandonment of the parental relationship" exception.
The movement toward abolishing the doctrine, however, was
quickly halted when the doctrine's viability was reaffirmed in Mauk v.
Mauk. 3 A distinguishing characteristic of the Mauk case was that
both parents were attempting to sue a child,"' whereas the aforementioned cases involved suits initiated by children against their parents.
The Mauk court stated that "a recognized corollary rule to parental
immunity is that a parent may not prosecute a tort action against his or
her unemancipated minor child." 6 5 In reaching its decision, the Ohio
Supreme Court relied on two rationales commonly offered to support
the parental immunity doctrine: "(1) the preservation of the peace and
harmony of the family, and (2) the prevention of fraud and collusion
made possible by the widespread existence of liability insurance."6 6 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by the
child immunity doctrine.67 Because the court stated that the child immunity doctrine was the corollary of the parental immunity doctrine, 8
the decision in Mauk appeared to strengthen the doctrine of parental
immunity.
It took only five months, however, for the Ohio Supreme Court, in
Kirchner v. Crystal, 9 to abruptly change its position and abolish the
doctrine of parental immunity.7 0 In a four to three decision, the supreme court declared that the "rationalizations underlying the doctrine
of parental immunity . . . [are] outdated, highly questionable and unpersuasive. '7 1 Thus, thirty-three years after the doctrine's "official"
birth in Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court joined the nationwide trend of
abolishing the parental immunity doctrine.72 By increasing the likelihood of a familial tort victim receiving compensation, the court also
reached a decision that was "in the interests of justice and fairness. '' 73

63. 12 Ohio St. 3d 156, 466 N.E.2d 166, overruled, Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d
326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
64. Id. at 156, 466 N.E.2d at 166.
65. Id. at 157, 466 N.E.2d at 167. The corollary to the parental immunity doctrine has been
referred to as the child immunity doctrine. See id. at 160, 466 N.E.2d at 169 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 168.
67. Id., 466 N.E.2d at 169.
68. Id. at 157, 466 N.E.2d at 167.
69. 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
70. Id. at 327, 474 N.E.2d at 276.
71. Id.
72. For an indepth analysis of how each state has ruled on the validity of the parental
immunity doctrine, see Hollister, supra note 27, at 528-32.
Kirchner, 15 Ohio
Published73.
by eCommons,
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In Shearer v. Shearer,74 the Ohio Supreme Court was confronted
with another opportunity to rule on the parental immunity doctrine.
The court reaffirmed its Kirchner decision by again stating that the
parental immunity doctrine was abolished in Ohio.7 5 The Shearer decision assured that the parental immunity roller coaster ride was finished.
The Shearer decision also provided a new reason for abolishing the
doctrine of parental immunity. The supreme court looked to those
states that had abolished the parental immunity doctrine and discovered that the abolition of the doctrine did not result in the realization
of any of the fears, such as fraudulent and collusive suits, that were
used to support the doctrine .7 This empirical approach, combined with
the historical approach relied on in Kirchner,7 7 justified the court's
holding that the doctrine of parental immunity should be abolished.
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Repudiation of the Four Justifications Supporting the Parental
Immunity Doctrine
The Ohio Supreme Court's decisions in Kirchner v. CrystaP8 and
Shearer v. Shearer 9 were consistent with the national trend of abrogating the doctrine of parental immunity.8" The court's rationale also
reflected the opinions of many legal scholars who have addressed the
doctrine of parental immunity.8 1 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court had
ample authority to review and rely on in support of its conclusion.
In both Kirchner and Shearer, the court identified four traditional
justifications for the doctrine of parental immunity: (1) preserving the
domestic peace, harmony, and tranquility of the family unit; (2)
74. 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
75. Id. at 95-96, 480 N.E.2d at 391. The Shearer court, in addition to affirming Kirchner's
abolition of parental immunity, also abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine. Id. at 96-99,
480 N.E.2d at 392-94.
76. See id. at 99-101, 480 N.E.2d at 394-95.
77. Id. at 95, 480 N.E.2d at 391. "The Kirchner case used an historical analysis, i.e., a
consideration of the history of the doctrine and the traditional arguments offered to support it."
Id. See Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 327-30, 474 N.E.2d at 276-79.
78. 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
79. 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
80. See Family Exclusion Clause Renders Vehicle Uninsured for Purposes of Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 28 ATLA L. REP. 54, 55 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Family Exclusion
Clause]. The Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the doctrine of parental immunity is
archaic is consistent with many recent decisions from other jurisdictions, as "the archaic doctrine
of family immunity is nearly everywhere in full retreat." Id. See, e.g.. Rousey v. Rousey, 499 A.2d
1199 (D.C. 1985); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Transamerica
Mont...., 656 P.2d 820 (1983); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d
Ins. Co. v. Royle, 776 (1984).
81. See, e.g.. W. KEETON. D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 907-10 (5th ed. 1984); Hollister, supra note 27, at 496.
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preventing possible interference with parental discipline and control;
(3) hindering the potential depletion of the family funds or exchequer;
and (4) preventing the possibility of fraud and collusion.82 The court
did not consider other justifications based on the similarity of the parental immunity doctrine to the interspousal immunity doctrine, or the
possibility that the negligent parent may inherit the injured child's recovery,8" obviously believing that these two arguments were unmerited.8 4 The court then repudiated the four principle rationales supporting the continued use of the parental immunity doctrine. 85
The Kirchner court relied on its holding in Signs v. Signs,8s to
demonstrate "the folly of the domestic tranquility rationale," stating: 87
" 'It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an unemancipated child to bring an action against his parent concerning the child's
property rights yet to be utterly without redress with reference to injury to his person.' "88 The court found no logical reason to conclude
that domestic harmony would be subject to greater disruption in a personal injury case than in a property rights case and consequently held
that the domestic tranquility rationale was not sufficient to justify the
use of the parental immunity doctrine. 89
The Ohio Supreme Court also noted that several other courts have
rejected the domestic harmony rationale, holding that it is the negligent act itself, rather than the lawsuit, that disturbs the tranquility of
the household. 90 The parental immunity doctrine merely increases family dissension by preventing the child or family from receiving liability
insurance benefits. 91 For example, without access to insurance benefits,
82. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 327, 474 N.E.2d at 276: Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 95, 480
N.E.2d at 390.
83. See Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 327, 474 N.E.2d at 276. For a case that did rely on
these two justifications, see Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P.2d 788 (1905).
84. That the court did not consider the analogy between parental and interspousal immunity
meritworthy is evident by its decision to abolish interspousal immunity in Shearer. See Shearer,
18 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 480 N.E.2d at 394.
85. See Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 327-29, 474 N.E.2d at 276-78; Shearer, 18 Ohio St.
3d at 95, 480 N.E.2d at 390.
86. 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
87. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 328, 474 N.E.2d at 277.
88. Id. (quoting Signs, 156 Ohio St. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748). Implicit in this quotation
is the notion that the parental immunity doctrine only reaches and bars tort-based claims but has
no impact on contractual claims against the parent. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. See, e.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); Elam v.
Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 136, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1980).
91. See Falco, 444 Pa. at 380, 282 A.2d at 355. In Falco, an action was instituted by a
daughter and her father against the child's mother because of the mother's alleged negligent driving. Id. at 373, 282 A.2d at 352. While the court abolished the doctrine of parental immunity, it
upheld the interspousal immunity doctrine because it was created by statute. Id.at 380-84, 282
A.2d at 355-57.
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the child may never be able to pay for and consequently may not receive the proper medical treatment, or the family may become indebted
as a result of having to make medical payments. In either event, there
would probably be family disharmony rather than harmony caused by
the parental immunity doctrine.
The final and most convincing argument used to establish that the
family harmony rationale is defective, was put forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Shearer:
If the elimination of parental immunity were a bad legal position, one
would reasonably expect to find that those states [that have abolished the
doctrine] were experiencing problems with the abrogation. A review of
the literature finds no law review articles entitled "Disintegration of the
Family in Wisconsin" or "Family Problems in New York Resulting from
Abrogation of Parental Immunity." 9
The court relied on empirical data 93 to conclude that family harmony
would not be disrupted by the abolishment of the parental immunity
doctrine. Accordingly, justice required that the doctrine of parental immunity be abolished. 94
In discarding the second alleged justification-possible interfer95
ence with parental discipline-the Kirchner court relied totally on a
California Supreme Court decision, Gibson v. Gibson.9" The Gibson
court noted that there were many instances where the issue of parental
discipline and control would not be involved.97 For example, in an automobile accident caused by a parent's negligent driving, a parent's ability to control and discipline his or her children is irrelevant to the ability to drive.9 8 While the California Supreme Court recognized that in
some situations parental authority might be affected, it reasoned that it
would be unjust to deny recovery to an injured child merely because of
the possibility that under some circumstances parental control may be
jeopardized. 99 Thus, the Gibson court recognized that parental control
1 0
did "not justify continuation of [the] blanket rule of immunity."

92. Id. at 95-96, 480 N.E.2d at 391.
93. The Shearer court stated, "Our analysis will be more empirical than historical.
Id. at 95, 480 N.E.2d at 391. Then, after discussing the effects of abolishing the parental immunity doctrine in New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the court concluded that "there is no
evidence or persuasive material that any of these states ever suffered adverse consequences for the
lack of such a rule." Id. at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 391.
94. Id. at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 391-92.
95. See Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 328-29, 474 N.E.2d at 277.
96. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
97. See id. at 920-21, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss3/9
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The Kirchner court also relied on the Gibson court's reasoning
when it repudiated the third justification for the parental immunity
doctrine-preventing the depletion of the family exchequer. 10 In Gibson, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the fact that liability
insurance would protect the parents from suffering financial disaster,
and that "'virtually no such suits [between parent and child] are
brought except where there is insurance.' "o102 Because it is unlikely
that a child would bring suit if he or she believed that such legal action
could financially destroy his or her family, the family exchequer argu0 3
ment is too weak to support the parental immunity doctrine.1
Another reason for finding the family exchequer justification unmerited was presented in the concurring opinion in the Oregon case of
Winn v. Gilroy.'0 In Winn, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the
parental immunity doctrine barred a wrongful death action by the decedent's mother against the decedent's father.' 0 5 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge George A. Van Hoomissen presented a well-reasoned argument for abolishing the parental immunity doctrine, 0 6
stating:
The family exchequer theory also lacks merit when examined
against the realities of modern life. Children may sue their parents in
actions based on contract or property, where no insurance likely exists,
without fear of depletion of family resources. If insurance exists, denial
of a cause of action is a more severe drain on family resources than
0 7
would be recognition of a claim for relief.'
By preventing the parent from relying on liability insurance, and consequently forcing the parent to pay out of his or her own pocket, the
family exchequer theory would actually do the opposite of what it pur-

101. See Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 328-29, 474 N.E.2d at 277.
102. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (quoting James,
Accidental Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 553
(1948)).
103. See id.
104. Winn v. Gilroy (Winn I), 61 Or. App. 243, 656 P.2d 386 (1983), rev'd, 296 Or. 718,
681 P.2d 776 (1984).
105. Id. at 245, 656 P.2d at 389.,
106. Id. (Van Hoomissen, J., concurring). Although Judge Van Hoomissen concurred with
the majority he did so because of the binding precedent established by the Oregon Supreme
Court. Id. (citing Chaffin v. Chaflin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964)); Cowgill v. Boock, 189
Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). Judge Van Hoomissen stated, however, that the "precedent should
be reexamined." Id.
A re-examination by the Oregon Supreme Court was quickly forthcoming. The court, in a
lengthy opinion, abrogated the broad doctrine of parental immunity, and remanded the case to the
circuit court for further proceedings. See Winn v. Gilroy (Winn I), 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776
(1984).
Winn i, 61 Or.
App. at 249, 656 P.2d at 389 (Van Hoomissen, J., concurring).
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ports to achieve. It would actually cause a draining of family funds
rather than preventing a depletion of the family exchequer.
In dealing with the final justification for the parental immunity
doctrine, the Kirchner court ruled that the fear of fraudulent or collusive suits was not a valid reason to uphold the doctrine of parental immunity. 10 8 The court noted that the potential for fraud and collusion
existed in every case, but there has always been reliance on the judicial
system to detect and prevent fraudulent actions.10 9 Therefore, the court
concluded that the need to compensate the injured party outweighed
the possible risks of fraud and collusion."1 0
The desire to compensate the tort victim led the Kirchner court to
draw an analogy between Primes v. Tyler, " ' a case dealing with the
Ohio Guest Statute,"1 2 and the facts of Kirchner, to conclude that the
fear-of-fraud theory did not warrant upholding the parental immunity
doctrine. " ' In Primes, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio
Guest Statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and section 16, article I, of the Ohio Constitution." 4 The Primes court stated
that the statute violated these provisions because it failed to afford a
special class of people, non-paying passengers, the right to compensation for tortious acts against them, while paying passengers were provided this right." 5 Following the reasoning of Primes, the Kirchner
court held that it was unjust "to deny an injured party a redressable
claim for injuries sustained simply because fraud and collusion may
occur in the exceptional case . . .-.
The due process rationale was also relied on by the Shearer court
when it reaffirmed the Kirchner court's decision to abolish the parental
immunity doctrine: "To continue to deny access to the courts on the
grounds of what may be in the face of overwhelming experience to the
contrary in the many other states, is nothing more than a denial of due
process.""' Therefore, a fear of fraudulent cases is unmeritorious and
should be rejected because it denies people their right to due process

108. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 329, 474 N.E.2d at 278.
109. Id.
110. Id.
III. 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
112. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1982). Although declared unconstitutional in the Primes decision, see infra text accompanying notes 114-15, the Ohio Guest Statute is
still part of Ohio's statutory law.
113. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 329, 474 N.E.2d at 278.
114. Primes, 43 Ohio St. 2d at 204-05, 331 N.E.2d at 729.
115. Id.
116. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 329, 474 N.E.2d at 278.
117. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 391.
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under the law. Because of the importance of this constitutional right, it
is surprising that this argument had not been raised more often.
The guarantee of due process under the law is a fundamental right
18
accorded citizens of our country and residents of the state of Ohio.'
Section 16, article 1, of the Ohio Constitution states: "All courts shall
be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall
have justice administered without denial or delay.""' 9 The right to due
20
process under Ohio law was reiterated in Armstrong v. Duffy,1
wherein the appellate court stated that "every citizen of this state [has
the right] to seek remedy by court action for any injuries done to him
in his person or property and . . . to have justice administered according to law without denial or delay ... ,,
'. To deny a child a right to
sue his or her parent for the injuries the child received as a result of the
parent's tortious conduct is a direct violation of due process. Therefore,
the doctrine of parental immunity is very likely unconstitutional,' 22 and
was properly abolished by the Ohio Supreme Court.
B.

The Impact of the Abrogation

One effect that the Kirchner and Shearer decisions are likely to
have is an increase in the use of family exclusion clauses in insurance
policies. A family exclusion clause is a provision in an insurance contract that denies liability coverage to an insured for torts committed
against another family member or person living in the same household
as the insured.12 3 The ramification of such clauses is likely to leave a
child in the same position he or she was in when the parental immunity
doctrine was recognized-unable to recover for the tortious injury inflicted by a parent. The likelihood and validity of the use of such
clauses in Ohio were discussed by the supreme court in Shearer when it
reviewed the possible effects its decision would have on liability insurance companies. 2 4 The court stated that "[i]nsurance is inextricably
involved with the issue of intrafamilial immunity, because as noted by
most of the writers on this issue, unless there is liability insurance in-

118. See State ex rel. Hoe[ v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 479, 138 N.E. 230 (1922).
119. OHIo CONST., art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
120. 90 Ohio App. 233, 103 N.E.2d 760 (1951).
121. Id. at 251, 103 N.E.2d at 768.
122. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 391-92. Although the Shearer court did
not explicitly state that the parental immunity doctrine was unconstitutional, it implied the same
as the court stated that the operation of the doctrine was "nothing more than a denial of due
process." Id.
123. Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion
Clause, 60 IOWA L. REV. 239, 254 (1974).
Shearer, 18 Ohio
St. 3d at 101, 480 N.E.2d at 395.
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trafamilial lawsuits do not occur.'1 25
The court noted that a liability insurer, when extending liability
coverage, has three alternative methods for dealing with intrafamily liability claims and potential problems of fraud and collusion: the insurer
can "refuse to write . . . policies [covering intrafamily claims]; it can
take precautions to eliminate the potential for fraud; or it can charge1' a6
premium so prohibitively expensive that coverage is unmarketable."'
the
It is the second option that is most troublesome, because it invites
1 27
clause.
exclusion
family
a
of
use
the
response,
most common
Family exclusion clauses became popular as a result of insurers'
fear of collusive suits between parents and their children. 12 8 By denying
an insured liability insurance coverage in a tort action by a family
member, a family exclusion clause has the effect of rendering an insured person, "uninsured," in intra-family tort actions. Thus, the existence of a family exclusion clause forces the child into a no-win situation-the child either sues the "uninsured" parent or accepts his or her
losses and does not sue. Because the vast majority of children would
not take the drastic measure of suing an "uninsured" parent, 2 9 their
injuries would go uncompensated.
In the dictum of the Shearer decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that it should not get involved with the question of whether family exclusionary clauses are valid. 3 0 The court stated: "Perhaps such
coverage [for family members] should be sold; perhaps it should not.
This is not for this court to decide; it is for the marketplace, and for the
buyers and sellers of insurance to decide."' 3 1 This statement displays
the court's inclination toward freedom of contract, a judicial laissezfaire policy. Although widespread use of such insurance provisions
would undermine the court's policy of compensating a tort victim for
injuries suffered, the court's position reflects that taken by the majority
of the courts which have dealt with this question. 3 2

125. Id. at 99, 480 N.E.2d at 394.
126. Id. at 100, 480 N.E.2d at 395.
127. See id.
128. See Family Exclusion Clause, supra note 80, at 55.
129. See Lambert, Family Law, 35 ATLA L.J. 247, 267-68 (1964). Children would be told
by their parents that the negligent parent would be forced to pay the damages out of his or her
own pocket because the child was excluded from liability coverage under the exclusionary clause.
Because the child would not want to financially destroy his or her parent, the child would not
initiate a suit against the negligent parent. See id. at 268.
130. See Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 101, 480 N.E.2d at 395.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cartnel, 250 Ark. 77, 463 S.W.2d 648
(1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1960); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 (1971); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984). See also Ashdown, supra note 125, at 254, 254
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In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ryan,13 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the effect that the abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine would have on family exclusion clauses,
stating:
The well-settled general rule in the construction of insurance contracts,
however, provides that parties are free to contract as they desire, and so
long as coverage required by law is not omitted and policy provisions do
not contravene applicable statutes, the extent
of the insurer's liability is
34
governed by the contract entered into.' *
Most courts have extended this contract principle to family exclusion
clauses and have held that such clauses are valid if they do not contravene any law or public policy. 35 By emphasizing that parties to a contract should be free to determine the terms of the contract, 36 the
Shearer court appears to be content with following the approach of the
majority of jurisdictions in upholding family exclusion clauses based on
the freedom of contract principle.137 In addition, the Shearer court's
opinion also displays the court's apparent belief that family exclusionary clauses do not violate public policy. This belief, however, is contrary to the Shearer court's rationale for abolishing the parental immunity doctrine.
In both Kirchner and Shearer, the Ohio Supreme Court based its
decision to abolish the parental immunity doctrine on the belief that a
victim should be compensated for injuries suffered as a result of another's negligent act. 38 Yet, the Shearer court simultaneously stated
that it would not address the issue of the validity of a family exclusion
clause that would leave a tort victim uncompensated.1 39 These positions
are inconsistent. As one commentator has observed: "The anomaly of
making a significant judicial policy decision and then allowing a relatively small group of financially concerned entities [i.e., insurance companies] to substantially alter the factual context within which that de-

n.98.
133. 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983).
134. Id. at 115.
135. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139
(1984) (family exclusion clause in homeowner's policy not violative of public policy). But see, e.g.,
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982) (family exclusion clause in automobile insurance contract violative of public policy based on legislative policy
behind financial responsibility act).
136. See Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 101, 480 N.E.2d at 395. See also supra text accompanying note 131.
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
138. Kirchner, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 330, 474 N.E.2d at 278; Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 96,
480 N.E.2d at 391.
Shearer, 18 Ohio
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cision was originally made seems apparent."'140 The Shearer court,
however, left the impression that it would do just that. It appears that
the court will now allow insurance companies to evade the public policy
rationale supporting the decision of the court. The Shearer court relied
on the need to compensate the victim of a tort when it abolished the
intrafamilial immunity doctrines, but it appears unwilling to use the
same policy consideration to hold family exclusion clauses invalid.
The position of the Shearer court is supported by many courts
which have upheld the use of exclusionary clauses based on the following rationales: (1) no state statute prohibits such clauses; 14 (2) the exclusion clause protects the insurer from fraudulent or collusive lawsuits
between family members; 4" and (3) when the state abides by the interspousal immunity doctrine, it should allow the validity of such family
exclusion clauses because neither spouse can recover. 4 3
The first justification for the use of family exclusion clauses, the
absence of a state statute which prohibits these clauses, is applicable to
Ohio because Ohio does not have a statute which considers the validity
of a family exclusion clause.' 4 4 The Ohio Supreme Court, nevertheless,
impliedly accepted their validity in Edmondson v. Motorists Mutual
Insurance Co.'4 5 By holding that the exclusion of relatives from death
benefit coverage had to be expressly stated, without ambiguity, in the
insurance contract,' 46 the court seemingly -held that family exclusion
clauses would also be valid if they were clearly expressed.1 4 7 Thus, in at
least one instance, the court displayed an inclination to uphold family
exclusion clauses. Hopefully, the Ohio Supreme Court will reconsider

140. See Ashdown, supra note 123, at 256.
141. See, e.g., Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983).
142. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traycik, 86 Mich. App. 285, 272 N.W.2d
629 (1979).
143. See, e.g.. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 488, 544 P.2d 444,
448 (1975) ("If this Court had found the doctrine of interfamily tort immunity to be void, the
validity of the policy provision would require further examination. Since we have held that the
doctrine remains valid in Montana, the underlying basis for the household exclusion remains
valid.").
144. Ohio does not have a statute either permitting or prohibiting family exclusion clauses,
but it does have a statute permitting some exclusions in automobile liability insurance policies. See
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.54 (Page 1982). Section 4509.54 provides:
A motor-vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability under any workers' compensation law, or any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of an employee of the
insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while
engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of any such motor vehicle, or any liability
for damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of, or transported by the insured.
Id.
145. 48 Ohio St. 2d 52, 356 N.E.2d 722 (1976).
146. Id. at 53, 356 N.E.2d at 723.
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its apparent stance on family exclusion clauses, and will rely on the
public policy considerations it used to abrogate intrafamilial tort immunities to declare family exclusion clauses invalid.
The argument that family exclusion clauses are required to protect
insurance companies from fraud and collusion should fail for the same
reason enunciated by the Shearer court when it held that such an argument did not support the continuation of intrafamilial immunities. 14 8
The Shearer court quoted Primes v. Tyler,149 wherein the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
"In all other cases, we rely upon the standard remedies of perjury,
the efficacy of cross-examination, the availability of pretrial discovery,
and the good sense of juries to detect false testimony if it should occur.
We do not withdraw the remedy from all injured persons in order to
avoid a rare recovery based upon false testimony."15 0
Insurers will be protected, as are defendants, by the safeguards built
into our legal system. The risk of fraudulent or collusive actions is not
great enough to outweigh the need to compensate tort victims."' These
same fears were raised to support the doctrine of interspousal immunity, but "a flood of fraudulent claims has [not] been noted in those
states with a long history of abrogating interspousal tort immunity."' 52
Therefore, the courts should not hold family exclusion clauses to be
valid merely because of the possible occurrence of a few fraudulent
cases.
Finally, the third justification for permitting the use of family exclusion clauses, the existence of the interspousal immunity doctrine, is
not viable because the Ohio Supreme Court, in Shearer, abolished the
interspousal immunity doctrine.15 3 Accordingly, a family member
should be able to collect under a liability insurance policy if either a
family exclusion clause does not exist or such clause is invalidated. In
Haines v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.,'5" the Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated a family exclusion clause, stating: "We think the rule
protecting the injured party's right to collect damages from the person
or persons responsible for his injuries (even if a member of his family)
and his insurer, is to be preferred over the rule of preventing that re-

148. See Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 480 N.E.2d at 393. '
149. 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975) (citations omitted).
150. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 480 N.E.2d at 393 (quoting Primes, 43 Ohio St. 2d at
201, 331 N.E.2d at 727).
151. See Comment, Family Exclusion Clauses: Whatever Happened to the Abrogation of
Intrafamily Immunity?, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 415, 423 (1984).
152. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 480 N.E.2d at 393.
153. Id. at 99, 480 N.E.2d at 394.
47 Wis. 2d 442,
177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
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covery."' 5 5 Because the Shearer court relied on the belief that a victim
should be compensated even if the negligent party is a parent or spouse,
the Ohio Supreme Court should follow the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
determination that the use of a family exclusion clause is inequitable
and invalid.
In Shearer, the court stated that the harmony of the marital unit
would be better protected if the negligently injured spouse was compensated because the negligent spouse has "more likely than not purchased
liability insurance to compensate those whom he [or she] injures
...
," 158 Because the spouse, or any family member, is most likely to
sue only if liability coverage exists, and if the court truly wants to compensate the victims of negligent acts, then it would be illogical for the
Ohio Supreme Court to uphold the continued use of family exclusion
clauses. This is especially true in light of the fact that the court has
several arguments at its disposal to justify holding such clauses invalid.
The foremost public policy consideration against the use of family
exclusion clauses is the inequitable treatment between family members,
who are excluded from recovering under the insurance policy, and nonfamily members, who are not so excluded. This disparity in treatment
is analogous to the unfair treatment children received under the parental immunity doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court should rely on the
same grounds-of due process and equal protection to hold family exclusion clauses unconstitutional as it did in abolishing the parental immunity doctrine.1 57 A family exclusion clause "prevents a specific class of
innocent victims, those persons related to and living with the negligent
[individual], from receiving financial protection under an insurance policy containing such a clause [while providing protection for others]. In
essence, this clause excludes from protection an entire class of innocent
victims for no good reason." 15 8 Children are at an extreme disadvantage because they have no control over the policies their parents
purchase. Thus, they have no means of protecting their financial status.' 59 It also is inconsistent to allow a child to recover from an insurer
when the child is involved in an accident with a neighbor, but to prevent the child from recovering when his or her injuries are caused by a
parent. The most troublesome aspect of a family exclusion clause is
that it denies liability insurance recovery to the individuals who are
most likely to be injured as a result of a parent's negli-

155. Id. at 451, 177 N.W.2d at 333.
156. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 480 N.E.2d at 393.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 111-22.
158. Wiscomb. 97 Wash. 2d at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
159. See id. at 211-12, 643 P.2d at 445-46.
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gence-children.1 6° Therefore, the person who is in the most need of
the financial assistance that an insurance policy provides is denied that
aid when a family exclusion clause is invoked.
Family exclusion provisions in insurance contracts can also be considered violative of public policy on the grounds of unconscionability.' 6'
Although there is no evidence of a tremendous increase in family exclusion clauses in Ohio insurance policies since the Kirchner and Shearer
decisions, these decisions are likely to cause such a reaction on the part
of insurers."8 2 Once these clauses become popular, the insured will be
forced to accept such policies if he or she wants to purchase liability
insurance, or the insured will be forced to pay a prohibitive premium
for a policy that does not contain such a clause.16 3 This will most likely
leave the insured in the untenable position of having to purchase a policy with exclusionary provisions or purchase no policy at all.
Furthermore, the possibility of overreaching arises in the context
of an insured's lack of knowledge of the inclusion of a family exclusion
clause in the policy. 64 Some insurance companies may not inform their
clients of the existence of a family exclusion clause or the company
may leave unknowledgeable customers to read and comprehend the
contract on their own. This results in what has been labeled a "failure
to 'honor the reasonable expectations' of the purchaser."'6 5 Under such
circumstances, an insured who is expecting to receive liability coverage
is shocked when he or she learns that the policy does not protect him or
her in intrafamilial tort cases. Under these circumstances, the insurer
has clearly gained an unfair bargaining position over the prospective
insured, and such clauses should accordingly be held invalid as violating public policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Kirchner v. Crystal'" and Shearer v. Shearer,'6 7 the Ohio Su-

160. See id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
161. See Comment, supra note 151, at 424. See also Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d at 209, 643
P.2d at 444.
162. See Family Exclusion Clause, supra note 80, at 55. "Once the courts gained momentum in curbing or abrogating family immunity rules, it was predictable that the carriers would
counter by inserting family or household exclusion clauses in liability insurance policies." Id. The
abolishment of intrafamilial tort immunities causes insurers to fear that family members will
bring fraudulent or collusive actions. To prevent such suits, the insurance companies rely on family exclusion clauses to prevent recovery against insurers in intrafamilial lawsuits. If the legislature and judiciary allow such clauses in insurance policies to stand, it is only logical that an
insurer will create such clauses to protect itself against possible fraudulent or collusive suits.
163. See Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d at 212, 643 P.2d at 445-46.
164. See id., 643 P.2d at 446.
165. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, - Mont.
656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983).
15 Ohio St. 3d1985
326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
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preme Court finally abolished the nonsensible and outdated doctrine of
parental immunity. The court's enlightened decision will assure that
children who are injured as a result of their parent's tortious conduct
will receive their right to due process under the Ohio Constitution.
Children will no longer be unjustly denied a right to recovery for personal injuries merely because of their familial ties with the tortfeasor.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision to allow a child to recover in a
tort action against his or her parent, however, will become ineffective if
the court allows the use of family exclusion clauses in insurance policies. The effect of such clauses is to force a child to sue an "uninsured"
parent. Because a child is unlikely to sue a parent under these circumstances, the child is left uncompensated and without any realistic remedy. Thus, the underlying policy consideration of the Kirchner court's
decision-the assurance that tort victims will be able to recover for
their injuries-will be defeated if insurance companies are permitted to
use family exclusion clauses.
The Ohio Supreme Court has two justifications to draw upon to
declare family exclusion clauses invalid. First, the court can rely on the
public policy of prohibiting unconscionable contracts. The court may
rule that insurers have unconscionably forced people seeking liability
insurance to accept family exclusion clauses. An insurer can accomplish this by placing extremely high premiums on policies that do not
contain family exclusion clauses. This leaves the purchaser in a position
where there is no choice, financially, but to accept the exclusion provision in the policy. This is an obvious violation of public policy, and such
contracts should be held invalid on the grounds of unconscionability.
The second principle the court can rely on is the due process
clause of the Ohio Constitution. Family exclusion clauses violate due
process guarantees by denying a person the opportunity to be compensated for his or her injuries. 1 8 When a child is confronted with a family exclusion clause, the injured child is left with the option to sue an
uninsured parent, which for all practical purposes is no option at all.
The uninsured parent, most likely, would be unable to pay the child's
judgment. Therefore, the child is left with no viable legal recourse
whatsoever. For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court should now

168. The due process argument is analogous to the one partially relied on by the Ohio
Supreme Court when it abolished the parental immunity doctrine. See supra text accompanying
notes II 1-22.
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follow through on the groundwork laid in Kirchner and Shearer, and
prohibit the future use of family exclusion clauses by insurance
companies.
Mark Lanni
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